








ANETT ERZSÉBET GÁCSI* 
 
The legal institution of ‘plea bargaining’  
in Hungary 
 





I. Introductory thoughts 
 
The current Hungarian Criminal Proceeding Act (Hungarian Act XIX of 1998; 
hereinafter referred to as the ‘Criminal Proceeding Act’) as adopted in 1998 and enacted 
in Summer 2003, has been amended at around 2,000 points by nearly 90 acts and 
several constitutional court resolutions, rendering this Act non-coherent. The Hungarian 
legislator has responded to the situation by developing the new Hungarian Criminal 
Proceeding Act (Hungarian Act XC of 2017; hereinafter referred to as the ‘New 
Criminal Proceeding Act’) which will become effective on 1 July 2018.1 
In general, it is ascertainable that there is a high demand in society for the fast and 
efficient completion of criminal proceedings. The objective of such proceedings is to 
hold accountable the perpetrators of each and every criminal offence in fair procedures 
and with the lowest possible monetary and temporal efforts. The legislator aims to 
accomplish this objective with the help of the New Criminal Proceeding Act. 
As far as the current Hungarian landscape is concerned, the statistics published by 
the Prosecutor General in November 2016 reveal that, overall, the duration of criminal 
proceedings has increased in the past few years.2 The average duration of investigations 
of 162.9 days in 2007 increased to 243.7 days by 2015. The average duration of 
prosecutor's office administration at first instance (i.e. the time elapsing from the date 
of receipt of documents by the prosecutor's office to the date of filing of the formal 
accusation) of 26.1 days in 2007 increased to 35.6 days by 2015. Also, the average 
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duration of the judicial phase (i.e. the time elapsing from the date of filing of the formal 
accusation to the date of adoption of the final judicial decision) of 356.8 days in 2007 
increased to 390.8 days by 2015. In order to (hopefully) improve the timeliness of 
proceedings, the legislator has changed the current legislation at multiple points 
resulting in the New Criminal Proceeding Act giving special attention also to the 
cooperation by the defendant (i.e. the rules of ‘plea bargaining’ as applied in Hungary).  
This study starts with a theoretical introduction (listing the reasons for changing the 
current regulation and some examples available to the legislator (for possible adoption 
into Hungarian law) including in particular the French model) which is followed by the 
presentation of how the cooperation by the defendant (i.e. ‘plea bargaining’) works in 
Hungary. This study has been made from the perspective of the right to a fair trial. 
Therefore, I have tried to find out how the principle of equality of arms (recognised as 




II. The ‘ars poetica’ of the legislation; examples and models; the failure of the institution of 
‘waiver of right to trial’ 
 
 
1. The ‘ars poetica’ of the legislation 
 
The basic concept of the Hungarian legislator to be applied to the codification was that 
it would be reasonable to distinguish cases in which the defendant confesses the 
criminal offence from cases where the defendant denies the charge and the prosecutor 
has to prove the defendant guilty. The reason being is that the confession provides an 
opportunity to cooperate with the defendant which could serve the interests of every 
party involved in the proceeding: it helps the authorities save time and costs; it reduces 
the sanction to be given to the defendant; it allows the victim to feel compensated for 
sure; and it also conveys the message that the perpetrator of the criminal offence will 
effectively be held accountable. This perception is not alien either in the science of 
criminal proceeding law or in legal practices.4  
 
 
2. Examples and models, including in particular French ‘amicable settlement’ type 
proceedings 
 
Based on the legal institution of ‘plea bargaining’ as applied in the United States of 
America (U.S.A.), more and more European countries have been trying to expedite and 
simplify the proceedings as a significant part of their reformation efforts.5 However, I 
think it is necessary to clarify in advance that the legal institution of ‘plea bargaining’ 
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does not effectively exist in the criminal proceedings in European countries in the same 
way as it exists in the criminal proceedings in the U.S.A. The reasons being are that the 
legal power of the prosecutor is more restricted compared to the U.S.A. model (for 
example, in amicable settlement in English criminal proceedings, the prosecutor shall 
not have influence on the type or extent of the punishment or not make any motion with 
respect to that6), and that the process of bargaining is restricted (for example, in the 
Italian amicable settlement model, the qualification of criminal offences constituting the 
subject matter of the charge is out of bargaining7). Therefore, in my opinion, it is better 
to describe the criminal proceedings in European law systems as ‘amicable settlement 
proceedings that are based on the confession of the defendant and similar to plea 
bargaining’ rather than directly using the term plea bargaining for them. (This is why 
the term plea bargaining is written with quotation marks in the title of this study.) 
Even though the Hungarian legislator had the opportunity to look at the amicable 
settlement systems applied in several countries as examples (including the systems 
applied in the aforementioned countries, the Spanish conformidad as well as the 
German, Austrian and Swiss amicable settlement systems), I will focus on the solution 
applied in French criminal proceedings in the following part of this study. One of the 
reasons for choosing the French model is that, based on legal historic traditions, the 
establishment of the system of French criminal proceedings [starting from the French 
Code of Criminal Instruction of 1808 (originally titled ‘Code d'Instruction Criminelle’ 
in French)] was a proven milestone in the evolution of European criminal justice 
services.8 One of the distinctive features of the ‘amicable settlement proceedings that 
are based on the confession of the defendant and similar to plea bargaining’ is that, in 
contrary to the Hungarian legislation, the French criminal proceeding follows the 
principle of opportunity as a general rule. However, as elaborated later in this 
document, the legal institution of ‘plea bargaining’ (i.e. real amicable settlement 
addressing all matters) does not effectively exist in this legislation either, due to the 
distinctive features of the continental (civil law) legal system. 
There are two types of amicable settlements that are similar to plea bargaining and 
currently applied in French criminal proceeding law: composition pénale and plaider 
coupable. Below are the descriptions of these two settlement types. 
 
2.1. Composition pénale 
 
For a long time, French law resisted the implementation of amicable settlement 
proceedings that are based on the confession of the defendant and similar to plea 
bargaining. It was not until 1999 that the first amicable settlement proceeding was 
incorporated into French criminal proceeding law (however, it was not effectively 
applied before 2001) with the title of composition pénale, meaning amicable criminal 
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law settlement (refer to Sections 41-2 and 41-3 of the CPP).9 The essence of this legal 
institution (that is often called ‘French plea bargaining’ in French bibliography due to 
its nature) is that “the law prescribes that the prosecutor, prior to the formal accusation 
being filed, shall have the discretion to propose an amicable criminal law settlement 
(i.e. criminal law ‘sanction’) to the defendant provided that certain conditions are met 
(only applicable to minor offense or misdemeanour, where the type of punishment is 
equal to or less than 5 years of imprisonment) and that the defendant confesses 
themselves guilty in committing one or more criminal offences or regulatory offences”. 
The settlement takes place only if the defendant accepts the prosecutor's proposal. In 
this type of proceeding, the role of the judge is restricted to a formal approval.10 
The scope of legal consequences that the prosecutor may propose (as a criminal law 
sanction) includes but is not limited to the following: the defendant to make payment 
for a specific amount of fine not exceeding the maximum amount of fine specified for 
the particular type of criminal offence committed; the defendant to hand over the asset 
or assets either used as means to commit the criminal offence or created as a result of 
the criminal offence; driver's licence or hunting permit to be withdrawn temporarily; the 
defendant to participate in some form of medical or disciplinary treatment offered in a 
healthcare institution (refer to Section 41-2 of the CPP).11 The prosecutor shall have 
discretion to select from the aforementioned options and also from the taxative list of 
options defined in Section 41-2 of the CPP.  
As it can be seen from the definition, another important element of this legal 
institution is the voluntary confession of the defendant. The defendant may either accept 
or decline the proposal made by the prosecutor but may not initiate any kind of 
bargaining. (The defendant may request that a defence counsel be involved in the 
proceeding. However, it is to be noted that amicable criminal law settlement is not a 
case of obligatory defence.) If the defendant does not accept the proposal, then the 
prosecutor shall file a formal accusation in accordance with the rules for normal 
proceedings and conduct the proceeding within the framework for normal 
proceedings.12 If the defendant accepts the proposal made by the prosecutor, it shall be 
recorded in a minutes and such minutes shall be submitted to the acting court.13  
The judge shall not modify the substance of the amicable settlement but shall verify 
its legitimacy (and may hold a non-public hearing for that purpose). If the amicable 
settlement is legitimate, the judge shall approve it, and if the amicable settlement is not 
legitimate, the judge shall decline it (no legal remedy shall lie against either of these 
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decisions).14 If approved, the amicable settlement becomes executable (no appeal shall 
lie) involving the same legal effect as the final judicial decision (i.e. the amicable 
settlement becomes a case decided).15 
An interesting feature of this legal institution is that it takes into consideration the 
interests of the victim, too. The law prescribes that if the victim is a known party and 
amicable criminal law settlement is applied, then the prosecutor shall oblige the 
defendant to provide for compensation for the damage caused by the criminal offence.16 
 
2.2. Plaider coupable 
 
Besides composition pénale, another legal institution appeared in 2004 that is also 
based on amicable settlement: it is called plaider coupable and also known as 
comparution sur reconnaisance préalable de culpabilité in the French criminal 
proceeding act, meaning appearance based on prior confession of guilt (refer to Sections 
495-7 and 495-16 of the CPP).17 Even though it is commonly cited as “real plea 
bargaining” in French bibliography, this legal institution is not identical to that applied 
in the U.S.A.18  
This legal institution shares the essential elements with the composition pénale and 
‘only’ differs in that the plaider coupable allows the prosecutor to apply effective 
sanction (as this term is construed from a substantive criminal law perspective) 
including the proposal of imprisonment up to and including one year.19 Subsequently, 
this type of amicable settlement proceeding is considered a case of obligatory defence. 
Besides confession by the defendant, another prerequisite of this legal institution is 
that the defendant take presence, in person, before the prosecutor. Another difference is 
that the decision shall be adopted in a public trial (refer to Section 495-9 of the CPP). In 
this trial, the judge shall verify whether the criminal offence has been appropriately 
qualified, whether the confession made by the defendant is volunteer and credible 
(authentic), and whether the sanction is in line with the severity of the criminal offence 
and the personal conditions of the defendant (these tasks of the judge are jointly called 
homologation or judicial assent).  
It means that in this type of amicable settlement, the judge has an active role rather 
than just formally signing a document.20 Appeal against the judge's decision may lie. 
 
 
                                                           
14  DANET, JEAN – GRUNVALD, SYLVIE: Brèves remarques tirées une première évaluation de la composition 
pénale. Actualité Juridique Pénal (AJ Pénal) 2004/5. p. 198.  
15  SAAS, CLAIRE: De la composition pénale au plaider coupable: le pouvoir de sanction de procureur. Revue 
Sciences Criminelles (RSC) 2004/9–12, pp. 833–834.  
16  FOURMENT 2013, p. 163. 
17  Loi n° 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004. FOURMENT 2013, p. 168., and  PÁPAI-TARR ÁGNES: Marchandage 
judiciaire á la française. Collega, 2007/2-3, pp. 99–103. 
18  PÁPAI-TARR 2012, p. 225. 
19  MOLINS, FRANÇOIS: Comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité. Rép. Pén. Dalloz. 2004/5, 
p. 2.; STEFANI – LEVASSEUR – BOULOC 2012, p. 588. 
20  LAMY, DE BERTRAND: La loi no. 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant adatation de la justice aux évolutions 
de la criminalité. Recueil Dalloz, 2004/28, p. 5. 
ANETT ERZSÉBET GÁCSI 




2.3. Lessons to be drawn 
 
As it can be seen above, these two types of amicable settlement legal institution 
similar to plea bargaining re-assign the classic tasks amongst the parties involved in 
justice proceedings. In the French model, the prosecutor shall apply (in fact, make 
motion for) the sanction and the judge shall approve it.21 Besides, the defence counsel 
acts more like a consultant in this model. On the other hand, the defendant becomes an 
active party, sort of ‘driving’ the proceeding.22 
All of this expediate the proceeding (primarily, the judicial phase becomes shorter) 
and the prejudice to the 0fundamental rights of the defendant is counter-balanced 
(compensated for) by the guarantee rules associated with these legal institutions. 
 
 
3. The failure of the separate proceeding titled ‘waiver of right to trial’ 
 
Waiver of right to trial is a separate proceeding that is based on the confession of the 
defendant and was incorporated into the Hungarian Criminal Proceeding Act on 1 
March 2000 with the aim to expedite criminal proceedings and make them more 
efficient. However, it has not brought the expected effects and still does not function as 
an efficient legal institution despite of being amended several times. There are no 
constitutional concerns to justify why this proceeding is applied so rarely as the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court laid the constitutional foundation for this legal 
institution as early as its implementation, stating that “providing incentive to confessing 
defendants in the form of allowances defined in the Hungarian Criminal Code is in the 
best interests of the Hungarian Constitution and cannot, in any way, be considered as a 
state coercion aimed at making defendants waive their constitutional rights”.23  
In my opinion, this separate proceeding has been suffering from obvious mistakes 
associated with the imposition of penalties (amongst other mistakes) since it was 
established.24  Based on the original rules for this separate proceeding and considering 
that Hungarian practices for the imposition of penalties tended towards the lower limit 
of the penalties, the application of reduced penalties did not bring real benefits to 
perpetrators. Also, in the initial times, it was not even possible to suspend the execution 
of imprisonment.25 The enactment of the new Hungarian Criminal Code (Hungarian Act 
C of 2012; hereinafter referred to as the ‘Criminal Code’) has brought along changes in 
the rules for imposition of penalties in relation to the waiver of right to trial. The 
essence of these changes does not go beyond the implementation of a possible minimum 
threshold, with the reduced maximum threshold for the penalties not having been 
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specified. As a direct result of that, in case of imposition of cumulative penalties, it does 
not make a difference to the defendant whether or not they waive the right to trial.26 
However, it is to be noted that this legislation does not make sense in that it gives 
privilege to a perpetrator committing organised crime in a criminal organisation if the 
perpetrator cooperates with the authorities. The reason why it does not make sense is 
that these perpetrators are subject to the old reduced penalties that guarantee a 
maximum threshold. Consequently, among all perpetrators, cooperative defendants 
remain the only beneficiaries to whom it would be worth to waive the right to trial. But 
the number of such perpetrators is very low in Hungary.27 
Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that the reason why this separate 
proceeding is applied rarely mainly lies in the substantive criminal law consequences 
of the legal institution waiver of right to trial. All of this have resulted in the participants 
in the proceeding becoming unmotivated. First, the investigating authority has become 
unmotivated as promoting the waiver of right to trial would cause the separate 
proceeding to expedite the judicial phase but not the investigatory phase. From the side 
of the authorities, the prosecutor may also become unmotivated as it shall bear 
significant amount of responsibility for being the party who shall enforce the state's 
request for the imposition of penalty and decide (after verifying that the conditions are 
met) whether or not the separate proceeding may be applied. Amongst other factors, it is 
the reason why the rate of application of the legal institution waiver of right to trial 
shows a great deal of variation across Hungary.28  The defence side also becomes 
unmotivated as the Hungarian substantive criminal law legislation does not seem to 
provide real benefits to the defendant who agrees to the restriction of their constitutional 
rights.29 Finally, it is also to be highlighted that legal practice studies have indicated that 
the reason why the legal institution waiver of right to trial is applied rarely (in addition 
to the reasons mentioned above) is that it competes with other separate proceedings 
with regards to the conditions of its application, amongst other aspects. Such competing 
separate proceedings include the ‘fast track court procedure’ and ‘expedited hearing’.30 
 
 
III. The forms and system of defendant cooperation in the New Criminal Proceeding Act 
 
“[…] Justice must not only be done: it must also be seen to be done […]”, said the 
European Court of Human Rights with regards to the study of the principle of equality 
of arms.31 In my opinion, this view also goes for the new Hungarian legislation about 
the cooperation by the defendant. 
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In the New Criminal Proceeding Act, the confession of guilt and the intention of the 
defendant to cooperate may lead to two types of amicable settlement. Below are the 
detailed descriptions of these types of cooperation by the defendant. 
 
 
1. Cooperation type 1 (amicable settlement about confession of guilt in the investigatory phase) 
 
Defendant cooperation type 1 has been established as a direct and express response to 
the failure of the legal institution waiver of right to trial. It is mainly aimed at such 
proceedings conducted before courts of first instance where a case-deciding final 
decision is adopted already at first instance after a relatively long evidence procedure.32 
In this form of cooperation, the amicable settlement starts as early as in the 
investigatory phase (the new Criminal Proceeding Act cites this legal institution as 
‘amicable settlement about confession of guilt’ amongst the rules for investigation). The 
reason being is that, in cases of obligatory defence, the prosecutor, the defendant and 
the defence counsel may enter into a formal amicable settlement about the confession of 
the guilt of the defendant with such settlement being independent of the court. Even 
though it may not be read out unambiguously from the legislation, this process may be 
broken down to the following 3 phases in my opinion. The first phase is the initiation of 
amicable settlement (not bound by formal conditions), available not only to the 
defendant and the defence counsel as it used to be, but now also available to the 
prosecutor. It is followed by the course of negotiations (also not bound by formalities) 
where bargaining may take place about the confession of guilt and the substantive 
elements of the amicable settlement. In this phase, the defence counsel shall be entitled 
to negotiate with the prosecutor separately. The only formality that applies to this 
negotiation is that the prosecutor shall state its position at the beginning of this 
negotiation. The third phase comprises entering into the amicable settlement. It must be 
made in written form since it has to be recorded in the minutes for the suspect's 
questioning and signed by the prosecutor, the defendant and the defence counsel at the 
same time (refer to Sections 407 to 409 of the New Criminal Proceeding Act). The 
amicable settlement may apply to a single criminal offence, multiple criminal offences 
or all criminal offences [refer to Section 410 (1) of the New Criminal Proceeding Act]. 
The latter raises the question whether entering into the amicable settlement will result in 
segregation of the criminal offences.  
The act contains an itemised list of the substantive elements of the amicable 
settlement with such elements divided into mandatory and optional elements. 
Mandatory elements include the description of the criminal offence in the same form 
and with the same level of details as specified in the indictment as well as the 
qualification of the criminal offence as established by the prosecutor; the statement 
made by the defendant about confessing the guilt and making a confessing testimony in 
relation thereto; and the penalty or individually applicable measure (with indication of 
the type, extent and duration). Optional elements include secondary penalty; measure 
(with indication of type, extent and duration) applicable in parallel with a penalty or 
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measure; for certain criminal offences, termination of the proceeding or rejection of the 
denunciation; obligation of or exemption from paying criminal costs; scope of other 
obligations undertaken by the defendant such as undertaking to satisfy a civil law claim 
made by a private party (refer to Sections 410 and 411 of the New Criminal Proceeding 
Act). The New Criminal Proceeding Act contains expressis verbis that none of the 
following shall be subject to the amicable settlement: coercive medical treatment; 
seizure; seizure of assets; or permanently rendering electronic data inaccessible [refer to 
Section 411 (6) of the New Criminal Proceeding Act]. (The legislator has established a 
so-called favor defensionis regulation for the case when no amicable settlement is 
entered into by and between the prosecutor and the defendant. It means that the 
initiation of the amicable settlement or the documents created in association therewith 
may not be used as evidence or means of evidence. In this case, the proceeding shall 
continue, under the rules applicable to standard proceedings, with the filing of a 
traditional formal accusation.) 
If a written amicable settlement is entered into, the case will proceed to the judicial 
phase with the filing of a special formal accusation (under the title ‘filing of formal 
accusation in case of amicable settlement’). In this case, the prosecutor shall be obliged 
to file the formal accusation with the same facts and criminal offence qualification as 
specified in the amicable settlement recorded in a minutes. The prosecutor shall also be 
obliged to submit to the court not only the indictment but also the minutes that contains 
the amicable settlement. The prosecutor shall make 3 motions in the indictment: for the 
court to approve the amicable settlement; for the type of penalty to be imposed or 
measure to be applied in line with the substance of the amicable settlement; and for the 
type of other measure or measures to be taken by the court in line with the substance of 
the amicable settlement [refer to Sections 424 (1) to 424 (3) of the New Criminal 
Proceeding Act].   
In case of cooperation type 1, the court proceeding shall be conducted within the 
framework of a separate proceeding (“proceeding in case of amicable settlement”) 
where the court shall hold a preparatory session at which the court shall not modify the 
substance of the amicable settlement but shall verify the legitimacy of the amicable 
settlement. The preparatory session shall start with the prosecutor stating the essence of 
the charge and the motions. After that, the court shall inform the accused party of the 
consequences of approval of the amicable settlement. One of these consequences that, 
in my opinion, may have outstanding significance is that no appeal shall lie against the 
approval decision. Then the court shall ask the accused party to state whether or not the 
accused party confesses guilt and waives their right to trial, both in accordance with the 
amicable settlement. In my opinion, this rule (i.e. the defendant shall re-state their 
position before the court) facilitates the enforcement of the principle of directness. 
Moreover, the legislator has added a guarantee rule according to which the defendant 
shall be entitled to consult with their defence counsel before giving answer to the 
question (refer to Sections 731 and 732 of the New Criminal Proceeding Act). If the 
accused party confesses guilt and waives their right to trial, the court shall verify if the 
conditions for approving the amicable settlement are satisfied (i.e. running a test 
consisting of 5 conjunctive elements specified in Section 733 of the New Criminal 
Proceeding Act). If court chooses to approve the amicable settlement with a court 
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decision, the proceeding shall continue as if the defendant had confessed guilt at the 
preparatory session in case of cooperation type 2. In this scenario, the case-deciding 
decision shall be made either at the preparatory session or, in exceptional cases, at a trial 
(refer to Sections 735 and 736 of the New Criminal Proceeding Act). If the court chooses 
to decline the amicable settlement (also with a court decision, against which no appeal 
shall lie), the proceeding shall continue under the rules applicable to standard proceedings, 
i.e. as if the defendant had not confessed guilt at the preparatory session in case of 
cooperation type 2 (refer to Section 734 of the New Criminal Proceeding Act). At this 
point, it can be noticed in my opinion that the legislator did not intend to establish two 
separate forms of cooperation by the defendant in the new legislation but rather intended 
to establish a system that combines them and correlates them to each other. 
 
 
2. Cooperation type 2 (form relating to the preparatory session) 
 
The legislator has established another type of cooperation by the defendant (in my 
opinion, with a subsidiary nature) the distinctive feature of which is that the 
investigation shall take place under the general rules (i.e. without an amicable 
settlement being entered into), but the preparation of the trial, more specifically the 
preparatory session (to be commended after the filing of the formal accusation) shall 
involve the establishment of a cooperation that does not require a formal amicable 
settlement but rather, virtually, the approval and reconciliation of the defendant.  
The legislator did not try to conceal its intention to establish the so-called 
preparation of the trial on the merits process in criminal proceedings. This process shall 
give place not only to the administrative tasks but also to the preparation of the trial on 
the merits.33 The reason being is that, if the reaction of the prosecution and the defence 
sides becomes obvious as early as at the beginning of the judicial phase, it may serve as 
a guide to establish which direction the evidence process should go to and may also help 
expedite the proceedings and make them more efficient. 
The stage of defendant cooperation type 2 is the preparatory session which the 
legislator has tried to make more concentrate. The baseline was to define this form of 
court proceeding: “a public session held after filing of the formal accusation with the 
aim to facilitate preparation of the trial on the merits, at which the accused party and the 
defence counsel may state their positions about the charge and contribute to how the 
criminal proceeding evolves, both prior to the trial” [refer to Section 499 (1) of the New 
Criminal Proceeding Act]. This session shall start with the prosecutor stating the 
essence of the charge and indicating the means of evidence that corroborate the charge. 
Even though the prosecutor may not know at this point whether or not the defendant 
confesses guilt, the prosecutor may make motion for the type, extent and duration of the 
sanction in order to facilitate orientation of the court's decision later in the proceeding. 
Then, the accused party shall be questioned where the accused party shall be given the 
so-called defendant warning (Miranda warning) and informed that the defendant may 
confess guilt. After that, the accused party shall be asked to make statement whether or 
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not they confess guilt in the criminal offence constituting the subject matter of the 
charge and thus waive their right to trial (refer to Section 502 of the New Criminal 
Proceeding). If the accused party confesses guilt (without a written amicable 
settlement), the court shall run a test consisting of three conjunctive conditions specified 
in Section 504 (2) of the New Criminal Proceeding Act with the aim to verify whether 
or not the confessing testimony had been given voluntarily. If the court accepts it, the 
court shall make the case-deciding decision either at the preparatory session or at a trial. 
In case of the latter, evidence process may be conducted but it shall not question the 
foundedness of the facts specified in the indictment or the matter of guilt (refer to 
Sections 504 and 505 of the New Criminal Proceeding). If the court does not accept the 
confessing testimony of the accused party or if the defendant denies to confess guilt in 
the first place, then the court proceeding shall continue under the rules applicable to 
standard proceedings with condition that the defendant shall be entitled to confess guilt 




3. Common rules and making conclusions 
 
Both types of cooperation by the defendant share the rule according to which the legal 
sanction and associated matters may constitute the subject matter of the bargain. On the 
other hand, facts or legal crime qualifications may not be subject matter of the amicable 
settlement as these are stated by the prosecutor during the proceeding. Another common 
feature of the two types of cooperation is the voluntary confessing testimony of the 
defendant that has been obtained without any kind of coercion of force. In each case, the 
court shall review such testimony and adopt a decision in connection therewith. 
The legal institution of cooperation by the defendant may be applied to any type of 
criminal offence. In my opinion, the legislation and its complex system imply that the 
legislator considers cooperation type 1 as the general rule in the system of cooperation. 
That is, the best way to expedite proceedings would be for the defendant to give 
confessing testimony and for the prosecution and defence sides to start cooperation, 
both as early as in the investigatory phase. Nonetheless, for pragmatic consideration, the 
legislator did not wish to lose the possibility for cooperation by the defendant even if 
the defendant does not give confessing testimony in the investigatory phase or if either 
or both sides lack full commitment towards the cooperation. So, there is a second option 
for cooperation by the defendant in which the defendant may, without a written 
amicable settlement, give a confessing testimony and waive their right to trial during the 
preparation of the trial, more specifically at the preparatory session that the legislator 
has made more concentrate. If the defendant does not wish to cooperate (and also does 
not waive their right to trial) either in the investigatory phase or during the preparation 
of the trial, the defendant may still, at any time during the proceeding of first instance, 
give (confessing) testimony and thus contribute to how the evidence procedure evolves. 
However, it would also mean that the defendant would deprive themselves of the 
possibility for their case to be completed more quickly and a (final) case-deciding 
decision to be made earlier. 
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The system of cooperation by the defendant (as interpreted by the author) 
 
Cooperation type 1 Cooperation type 2 
In the investigatory phase: the prosecutor – the 
defendant – the defence counsel may enter into a 
formal amicable settlement about the confession of 
guilt (“amicable settlement about confession of guilt” 
– refer to Chapter LXV of the New Criminal 
Proceeding Act) 
Investigatory phase: in accordance with general 
rules (i.e. no amicable settlement) 
Filing of formal accusation: in accordance with 
special rules (“filing of formal accusation in case of 
amicable settlement” – refer to Section 424 of the 
New Criminal Proceeding Act) 
Filing of formal accusation: in accordance with 
general rules (refer to Sections 421 to 423 of the 
New Criminal Proceeding Act) 
Judicial phase: separate proceeding – “proceeding in 
case of amicable settlement” (refer to Chapter XCIX 
of the New Criminal Proceeding Act) 
- the court shall decide whether or not the amicable 
settlement is legitimate 
- the court shall not modify the substance of the 
amicable settlement 
After filing of the formal accusation starts the 
negotiation process during the preparation of the 
trial, more specifically at the preparatory session. 
This process does not result in a formal amicable 
settlement but rather gives the defendant the 
opportunity to approve the situation and reconcile 
themselves. 
approves the amicable 
settlement (with a 
decision against which 
appeal shall not lie) 
declines the amicable 
settlement (with a 
decision against which 
appeal shall not lie)  
the accused party 
confesses guilt 
the accused party does 
not confess guilt 
passing a judgement: 
either at the preparatory 
session or at the trial 
case-deciding decision: 
in accordance with the 
rules applicable to 
standard proceedings 
if the court accepts it: 
the court shall pass a 
judgement either at the 
preparatory session or 
at a trial 
in this case, or if the 
court declines the 
confessing testimony: 
the court shall make a 
case-deciding decision 
within the framework 
of a standard 
proceeding (with 
condition that the 
defendant shall have 
the right to confess 
guilt at any time) 
What are the items that may not be subject matter of an amicable settlement? Facts, and legal qualification 
(these are stated by the prosecutor) 
What are the items that may be subject matter of bargaining? Legal sanction and associated matters 
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Overall, it can be stated that the rules for cooperation by the defendant as set forth in 
the new legislation as well as the associated guarantee provisions (for example, cases of 
obligatory defence; verification of the legitimacy of any confessing testimonies made 
before the court and of any amicable settlement; extended scope of warnings to be given 
to the defendant during the proceeding) comply with the requirements for fair trials. 
Moreover, this legislation does not derogate the more broadly construed principle of 
equality of arms, either – if the defendant chooses to waive their fundamental right to 
trial, they will receive, in exchange, quicker proceeding and certain substantive criminal 
law allowance.34 (However, as detailed in Section II.3 of this study above, such 
allowance in its current form does not give the perpetrators true benefits in my opinion. 
This aspect of substantive criminal law rules would be worth reconsideration.) 
Therefore, I find proceeding law rules appropriate. However, the legislation 
unfortunately seems to have some mistakes typical to ‘works of multiple authors’. 
These mistakes render some of the provisions concerning cooperation uncertain or 
rather ambiguous than not. Some examples are already mentioned in this study such as 
the matter of cooperation type 1 where the phases of the negotiation for amicable 
settlement cannot be read out unambiguously from the legislation.  
Both types of cooperation may give rise to the question why the victim has been left 
out from the process of cooperation. The reason being is that there is a separate legal 
institution aimed at helping the victim and the defendant reach a sort of ‘agreement’. 
This legal institution is called mediation proceeding and taxonomically separated from 
the system of cooperation by the defendant. However, the French model (where, if the 
victim is a known party, the prosecutor shall oblige the defendant to compensate the 
victim for the damage caused by the defendant) could serve as a good example to 
reinforce the rights of the victim (private party) in this system by, for example, making 
the ‘undertaking to satisfy a civil law claim made by a private party’ a mandatory 




IV. Closing thoughts 
 
“Justice may fade away as time passes by”, said the French criminalist Edmond 
Locard.35 This thesis is evergreen as the matter of how criminal proceedings could be 
expedited and made more efficient is constantly present in both legal theory and legal 
practice. 
The possible solutions to look at by the Hungarian legislator during the codification 
works in the quest of expediting proceedings and making them more efficient, included 
for example the legal institution of plea bargaining working excellently in the American 
continent and the amicable settlement type proceedings conducted in Europe. As a 
                                                           
34  GÁCSI 2018, p. 285. 
35  PRADEL, JEAN: La célérité et les temps du procès pénal, Comparaison entre quelques législations 
européennes. In: Delmas-Marty, Mireille (ed.): Champ pénal – Mélanges en l’honneur du professeur 
Reynald Ottenhof, Paris, 2006. p. 251.  
ANETT ERZSÉBET GÁCSI 




result, the new legislation has established the rules for cooperation by the defendant and 
the framework within which they should be applied. When establishing the system of 
cooperation based on the defendant's confessing testimony, the legislator took into 
consideration the failure of the separate proceeding titled ‘waiver of right to trial’. The 
establishment of the defendant cooperation forms and their complex system (which, in 
some points, resembles the solution applied in the French model) was, in part, a 
response to that failure.  
It is also to be noted that such cooperation may involve risks to almost all ‘parties’. 
One of them is the risk of “point of no return” commonly mentioned in international 
bibliography. This risk means that if the defendant is too early to give a confessing 
testimony during the proceeding, it may deteriorate the defending strategy and 
proportionately reduce the possibility for the defendant to be acquitted.36 In my opinion, 
the rules for the new system of cooperation by the defendant along with the associated 
guarantees comply with the requirements for fair trial and do not derogate the more 
broadly construed principle of equality of arms, either. However, for this legislation to 
achieve its objective (expedition and increasing efficiency), the parties have to perceive 
that they have interest in the application of this legislation. However, it seems that 
achieving the parties' perception of being interested would require, amongst others, 
amending the rules of substantive law in a direction that is more favourable to the 
defendant.  
Besides, the legal institution of cooperation by the defendant gives rise to numerous 
questions (mainly dogmatical ones relating to proceeding law). Some of such questions 
about cooperation type proceedings, for example, are how impartial judges can remain 
in such proceedings, and whether or not this legal institution derogates the function of 
finding justice. In my opinion, by establishing the various types of cooperation by the 
defendant in Hungarian criminal proceedings, the legislator has given the judge (and the 
judicial phase) the very role of securing the legitimacy of the amicable settlement and 
the voluntariness of the confessing testimony and safeguarding the amicable settlement 
process. All of this help ensure that the principle of judicial impartiality cannot be 
derogated. [However, it may cause an interesting situation if the court declines the 
amicable settlement (in case of cooperation type 1) or does not accept the accused 
party's confession of guilt (in case of cooperation type 2) as either of these scenarios 
would oblige the court to conduct the proceeding under the rules applicable to standard 
proceedings as if no amicable settlement had been entered into (in case of cooperation 
type 1) or if the accused party had not confessed guilt (in case of cooperation type 2).] 
Also, justice shall be treated as a justice of golden mean, without the addition of any 
qualifier word, and in the quest of justice, the expedition of proceedings (with the 
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GÁCSI ANETT ERZSÉBET 
 
A MAGYAR „VÁDALKU” INTÉZMÉNYE, AVAGY A TERHELTI 





Az 1998-ban elfogadott, majd 2003 nyarán hatályba lépett magyar büntetőeljárási 
törvényt (1998. évi XIX. törvény, a továbbiakban: Be.) mára közel 90 törvény, több 
alkotmánybírósági határozat hozzávetőlegesen 2000 helyen módosította, amely 
koherencia zavart okoz. Erre reagált a magyar jogalkotó, amikor megalkotta az új 
magyar büntetőeljárási törvényt (2017. évi XC. törvény; a továbbiakban: új Be.), amely 
2018. július 1-jén fog hatályba lépni. 
Általánosságban elmondható, hogy jelentős társadalmi igény mutatkozik a 
büntetőeljárások gyors és egyben hatékony befejezése iránt. Ezek lényege, hogy a 
bűncselekmények elkövetőit kivétel nélkül, minél kevesebb pénzbeli és időbeli 
ráfordítás mellett, tisztességes eljárásban vonják felelősségre. Az új büntetőeljárási 
törvény ezeknek a céloknak próbál eleget tenni. 
Jelen tanulmányban egy elméleti bevezetőt követően (mi volt az újra szabályozás 
indoka, milyen minták álltak a jogalkotó előtt, különös tekintettel a francia modellre) a 
terhelti együttműködés (a magyar „vádalku”) rendszerét mutatom be. A vizsgálatot a 
tisztességes eljáráshoz való jog szemüvegén keresztül végzem el, amelynek során 
figyelemmel leszek arra, hogy vajon az új szabályozásban a tisztességes eljáráshoz való 
jog lényegi elemeként elismert fegyverek egyenlőségének elve miként érvényesül. 
 
